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APPENDIX "A"
to
First Report
Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee

MISSION OF ORE

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Appendix A: "Basic Documents: Preliminary Report on Mission of ORE

1. The basic documents examined were:

- (a) The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 1947), Sec. 102.
- (b) National Security Council Directives (NSCID).
No. 1 of 12 Dec. 1947; No. 3 of 18 Jan. 1948.
- (c) Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCI),
No. 3/1 of 8 July 1948; No. 3/2 of 13 Sept. 1948.
- (d) ORE Statement of Functions of 15 July 1948, confirmed
in Organization and Functions CIA of 1 Jan. 1949.

2. Discussion

(a) NSC 1947, Sect. 102 (d) (3), defined one of the duties of CIA as, "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for ... appropriate dissemination and to perform ... additional services of common concern"

(b) NSCID 1, paras 4, 7, 5, expands the preceding as follows:

(1) "... shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence...."

(2) "... shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the NSC determines...."

(3) "... shall disseminate national intelligence
Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."*

* Note is taken that sub-para (3) introduces questions of procedural relations between CIA and Intelligence Agencies, but does not define or necessarily limit the responsibility of CIA.

(c) NSCID 3, paras. 1 (d) (e), defines National Intelligence,

(1) Negatively, by distinguishing it from Departmental Intelligence, which is, "that intelligence, including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency ... to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."

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(2) Positively, as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department . . . , and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department."*

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- * It is noted that Current Intelligence is defined as "spot information or intelligence . . . of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs . . . ;" and that it shall be produced and disseminated by all Departments and Agencies, including CIA, "to meet their internal requirements or external responsibilities...."

It is noted that Staff Intelligence is defined as "intelligence prepared by any department through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it . . . to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities; and that a department has the "ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require."

(d) No additional spelling out of the CIA responsibility to produce national intelligence was made at the NSC level. In particular, the relevant parts of the statements assigning responsibility were not reformulated as a statement of mission for ORE. DCI Directives, examined from this point of view, provide no such statement. They spell out problems of concurrence and dissent. This lack of specific interpretation, not significantly felt at the Director IAC level, created difficulties at the operational level of ORE where it was necessary to plan production with no other guide than a broad responsibility to produce national intelligence.

(e) ORE has attempted to fill the need in its Statement of Functions, later approved by DCI and incorporated in Organization and Functions CIA of 1 Jan. 1949. ORE is there defined as "the exclusive (except for science) intelligence evaluation, analysis, and production component of CIA." *

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- * A question arises of whether other Offices of CIA -- OSO, OPC -- do not also produce and disseminate; and whether ORE is committed to their support.
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The mission of ORE is there stated to be responsibility for the production and presentation of national intelligence. A slight expansion of the basic definition of national intelligence is made in the phrases, "required for the formulation and administration of policy and operational decisions affecting national security;" and "reports and estimates will present and interpret the significance of foreign conditions and develop-

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ments which affect national security." Actually the effort to fill a need does not result in an essential definition of mission by which Branches and Groups can uniformly be guided. The spelling out is in functional terms describing the existing activities and procedures of Branches and Groups. The statement is primarily descriptive of what has been and is being done; and of the division of responsibility among the Branches and Groups. In consequence, a statement of an ORE mission, capable of being used to guide a production effort, does not emerge.

3. Conclusions from Discussion

(a) It is considered, on the basis of this analysis, that a significant gap exists between the basic NSCID documents, which broadly indicate the mission of CIA, and the actual basis on which ORE produces intelligence. This gap, which should normally have been bridged by spelling out the broad statement of mission in precisely clarified operational directives, has apparently been filled instead by:

(1) An accumulation of ad hoc commitments, in consequence of responding to specific requests.

(2) An accumulation of particular interpretation of mission, deriving from the capabilities, organization, work-habits, inter-agency contacts, and personal judgments of Branches and Groups.

(b) It is considered that there is no available basis for "appraising the degree of correspondence that exists between the ORE production effort and its missions" because

(1) National Intelligence, which it is the mission of ORE to produce on behalf of CIA, has not been defined in a way that permits the planning and operation of an effective production effort.

(2) The production effort has, instead, grown up in response to various and not necessarily correlated demands, and to various and necessarily generally accepted interpretations of basic documents.

(c) The basic responsibility of CIA, phrased in terms of "national intelligence," though stated in the general directives, has not been given the more explicit statement and definition needed if it was to provide the basis for planning and directing a supporting production operation; i.e., become the mission of ORE.

(d) DCI's 3/1, 3/2 are essentially concerned with procedures and do not provide the statement and definition of mission required by ORE.

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